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I. INTRODUCTION

F

ew international humanitarian law topics are proving as problematic in
modern warfare as “classification of conflict,” that is, the identification of
the type of conflict to which particular hostilities amount as a matter of
law.1 Classifying the conflict in question is always the first step in any international humanitarian law analysis, for the nature of the conflict determines
the applicable legal regime. Accordingly, classification is a subject of seminal importance.
The current difficulties derive from the advent of hostilities over the
past two decades that do not neatly fit the traditional bifurcation of conflict
* Chairman, International Law Department, U.S. Naval War College. A previous version of this paper was published in 17 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245
(2012). The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy or
Dept. of Defense.
1. For a comprehensive survey of the subject, including case studies, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICT (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2011).
The work is the culmination of a two-year Chatham House-sponsored project involving a
group of international experts. This article has benefitted from participation in that process and the author is grateful to his colleagues for their insights.
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into either State-on-State or purely internal. For instance, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) struggled with criteria
for internationalization of non-international conflict in its first case, Tadić.2
Less than a decade later, transnational terrorism refocused attention on
classification issues. Was such terrorism international in character because
it transcended borders or non-international because it did not involve the
forces of one State engaging in hostilities against those of another (or was it
even armed conflict at all)?3 More recently, external recognition of the National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya raised the
question of whether such recognition “de-internationalized” the conflict
between the States that were fighting on the side of the rebels and Qaddafi’s forces.4
In the future, cyber warfare will further complicate classification. Cyber
operations have the potential for producing vast societal and economic disruption without causing the physical damage typically associated with
armed conflict. They are also inherently transborder, thereby frustrating
any approach to classification based on geographical factors. Moreover,
massive attacks can be launched by a single individual or by a group that is
organized entirely on-line. This is in sharp contrast to traditional warfare,
which depends on either the involvement of a State’s armed forces or that
of a group capable of mounting typical military operations.
2. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) [hereinafter Tadić Decision on Defence Motion]. The seminal article on internationalization is Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case
Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 145
(1983). See also Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić Case, 7
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (1996); Theodor Meron, Classification
of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout, 92 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1998).
3. For conflicting views on this subject, see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against
Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 2006(2) PD 459 [2006] (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (2007), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_
eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
4. Clearly, the conflict between NATO (and other) forces and the Libyan security apparatus was international in character. The question is whether the recognition of the rebels (National Transitional Council) meant that NATO forces were now fighting on the
side of the government against dissident armed forces (the remnants of the Libyan armed
forces still loyal to Qaddafi) such that the conflict became non-international. On the
recognition of the National transitional Council, see Stefan Talmon, Recognition of the Libyan
National Transitional Council, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS (June
16, 2011), http//www.asil.org/ insights110616.cfm.
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This article explores these and other classification of cyber conflict issues.5 Two caveats are in order. First, the occurrence of cyber operations in
no way alters the classification of an ongoing kinetic conflict. The paradigmatic example is the cyber operations conducted by “patriotic hackers”
during the 2008 international armed conflict between Georgia and Russia.6
Second, this article will not consider the possible emergence of new categories of armed conflict, such as “transnational armed conflict.”7 Rather it
adopts a conventional approach, one acknowledging two basic genre of
conflict—international and non-international. To the extent cyber operations bear of classification, they do so within this generally accepted
framework.
II. THE BASIC TYPOLOGY
The modern era of conflict classification began in 1949 with adoption of
the four Geneva Conventions.8 Earlier treaties governing hostilities had
5. On classification more generally, see Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 69 (2009); Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst &
Susan Breau eds., 2007).
6. On the Estonian and Georgian cases, see generally ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA
& LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (2010).
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The
Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT TRANSNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 295 (2006); Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A
Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMPLE LAW
REVIEW 787 (2008); Geoffrey S. Corn, Making the Case for Conflict Bifurcation in Afghanistan,
in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 181 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009)
(Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). For a well-reasoned piece
suggesting a category of “extra-State” armed conflict, see Roy Schondorf, Extra-State
Armed Conflict: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1 (2004). The International Committee of the
Red Cross has correctly rejected the notion of armed conflicts that are other than international and non-international. International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term
“Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? (Mar. 2008), http://www.icrc.org
/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
8. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
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been silent as to the conditions under which they applied. They merely assumed the existence of a “war.”
Lassa Oppenheim set forth the classic definition of war in his 1906
treatise International Law: “War is a contention between two or more States
through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other
and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.”9 The critical
element in the definition was that war must be between States. Intra-State
conflict was principally a matter of domestic concern unless it rose to the
level of a “belligerency.”10 Only then, and only because the conflict now
resembled inter-State hostilities, did the law of war attach.
Oppenheim’s definition implied that the existence of a war was a question of fact. The undeclared 1905 war between Japan and Russia brought
this approach into question. In response to the conflict, the 1907 Second
Hague Peace Conference adopted Hague Convention III relative to the
Opening of Hostilities. In that instrument, State parties agreed that “hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit
warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an
ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.”11 Consequently, a failure to
declare war or the non-recognition of a state of war by a party to the conflict precluded application of treaties governing the conduct of hostilities.
Subsequent events discredited this formalistic approach. The Spanish
Civil War illustrated the extent to which fratricidal violence could match
that which occurred during inter-State conflict,12 while the carnage of the
Second World War highlighted the risk of leaving humanitarian law to the
mercy of political decisions as to whether to declare war. Sensitive to these
realities, the international community took a different tack in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The approach taken in those instruments, which recog-

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC I–IV respectively].
9. LASSA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 56 (1906).
10. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 15.1.2 (2004). On belligerency, see Yair M. Lootsteen, The Concept of
Belligerency in International Law, 166 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 109 (2000).
11. Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538, 1 Bevans 619.
12. Interestingly, parties to that conflict occasionally agreed to apply the norms set
forth in the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. See Frédéric Siordet, The Geneva Conventions and Civil War, in III INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (Supp. to
Nos. 8, 9 & 11) (Aug., Sept. & Nov. 1950).
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nizes war in both the technical and material sense, has since matured into
customary international law.13
The Geneva Conventions adopt a bifurcated scheme in Articles 2 and
3, which are “Common” to all four conventions. Common Article 2 sets
forth the standard for international armed conflict. It provides that “the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.”14 Reduced to basics, there are two key factual criteria for international armed conflict—a confrontation between States and hostilities that
amount to “armed” conflict.
In 1949, Common Article 3 signaled a sea change in the international
community’s attitude towards internal conflagrations, for it represented the
first lex scripta expressly applicable to non-international armed conflicts. By
its terms, the article applies to an “armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”
As with Article 2, an armed conflict is a condition precedent to applicability, although the article does not address the nature of such a conflict in the
non-international context. One point is clear, though. Given Common Article 2, a non-international armed conflict cannot involve hostilities between two or more States. Its applicability is resultantly limited to conflicts
between a State and an armed group or those in which multiple armed
groups are fighting each other.
In light of the many post-1949 conflicts, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) convened a Diplomatic Conference between 1973
and 1977 to “update” international humanitarian law. The Conference
adopted two Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol I addresses international armed conflict by reference to Article 2 of
the 1949 Conventions.15 Controversially, it also reaches “armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupa13. For instance, guidance issued by States to their armed forces typically adopts this
approach. See, e.g., U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, NWP 114M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations ¶¶ 5.1.2.1 & 5.1.2.2 (2007). On the notion of “war,” see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 3–15 (4th ed. 2005).
14. GC I-IV, supra note 8, Common art. 2. The article also extends applicability of the
Conventions to occupation, even when uncontested.
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(3), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
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tion and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination.”16 Numerous States, most notably the United States, refused
to become party to the instrument, in part due to this latter provision.17
Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts.
However, it sets a higher threshold of applicability than Common Article
3’s naked reference to armed conflict that is not international. By Article 1,
Protocol II applies
to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of [Additional
Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.18

The provision differs from Common Article 3 in its requirement that
dissident or other armed forces control territory and its limitation to conflicts involving a State, thereby excluding non-international armed conflicts
between organized armed groups. Importantly, Article 1 specifically excludes “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not
being armed conflicts” from the ambit of non-international armed conflict.19 This exclusion has been broadly accepted as reflective of customary
international law in all non-international armed conflicts, a fact evidenced
by its adoption in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.20
Taken together, this collage of provisions envisions four categories of
conflict: 1) international armed conflict between States; 2) international
16. Id., art. 1(4).
17. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 232 (2011). See also Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 419
(1987).
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
19. Id., art. 1(2).
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2(d), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90. The statute is not limited to conflicts that meet the Additional Protocol II
threshold.
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armed conflict involving national liberation movements; 3) noninternational armed conflict between a State and an organized armed group
or between organized armed groups; and 4) non-international armed conflict at the Additional Protocol II level. The second and fourth categories
are relevant only to application of Additional Protocols I and II respectively for Parties thereto. The first and third are acknowledged as customary
categories of conflict.
III. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CYBER CONFLICT
As noted, international armed conflicts must be both “armed” and “international.” The first criterion presents the quandary that cyber operations
are not kinetic in nature and do not employ what would in common usage
be considered as “weapons.” At first glance, a conflict consisting of only
cyber operations would, therefore, appear not to be “armed.” Such a conclusion would be incongruous for cyber operations can have highly destructive, even deadly, results. A State involved in an exchange of cyber
attacks at this level would be very likely to characterize the situation as international armed conflict, much as it would if it fell victim of another
State’s non-kinetic bacteriological attack.
The official ICRC Commentary to Article 2 provides that
any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention
of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning
of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of
war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much
slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces.21

The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I is in accord:
[H]umanitarian law . . . covers any dispute between two States involving
the use of their armed forces. Neither the duration of the conflict, nor its

21. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter GC III COMMENTARY]. See also
Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 131
(1979). But see Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 37, 48 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed.
2009).
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intensity, play a role: the law must be applied to the fullest extent required
by the situation of the persons and the objects protected by it.22

Adopting the same approach, the ICTY has defined armed conflict as
the “resort to armed force between States” without recognizing any
threshold for the duration or intensity of hostilities.23
By these standards, the concept of armed conflict implies forceful acts
at whatever level.24 A fortiori, any cyber operation that amounts to an “attack” in international humanitarian law terms would qualify as armed. Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I defines attacks as “acts of violence
against the adversary, whether in offence or defence.” Although cyber operations are not violent in themselves, they can nonetheless generate violent consequences. To the extent that they result in injury or death of persons or damage or destruction of property, they are attacks satisfying the
armed criterion of armed conflict.25 For instance, if a State was behind the
2010 “Stuxnet” attack against supervisory control and data acquisition systems upon which the power centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear power plant
depended, it would meet this threshold because physical damage resulted.26

22. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GECONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 62 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1988) [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY].
23. Tadić Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 2, ¶ 70.
24. It should be noted that an armed conflict can exist even in the absence of uses of
force. For instance, Common Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions extends to
“all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if
the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”
25. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89, 92–94 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo &
Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College International Law
Studies). It has been suggested that operations falling below the threshold may also qualify. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT 31IC/11/5.1.2, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 37 (2011) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT]; Knut Dörmann, Applicability of the Additional
Protocols to Computer Network Attacks 6 (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets
/files/other/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf (paper delivered at the International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law, Stockholm). The issue is addressed at length in the TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). The author is
grateful to his colleagues on the project leading to the Manual for their insights, many of
which find reflection in this article.
26. The question remains as to whether a State was behind the operation.
NEVA
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But might a cyber operation by one State against another that does not
cause physical injury or damage nevertheless initiate an armed conflict? The
ICRC has taken the position that a cyber operation that “disables” an object is also an attack even when it does not cause physical damage.27 This is
a reasonable extension of the notion of damage, at least to the extent repair
(as distinct from merely reloading software) of the cyber infrastructure
concerned is necessitated. Since the operation is an attack, it is also armed
in terms of qualification for armed conflict. That said, a de minimis standard
should attach. In much the same way that a soldier throwing a rock across
the border does not propel the States concerned into international armed
conflict, it would not suffice, for instance, to merely disable a single computer that performs non-essential functions.
Beyond these cases, it is unclear where State practice will lead. Consider
a situation in which a State takes control of critical infrastructure in another
State, conducts denial-of-service attacks against essential societal services,
or begins deleting or changing data in a manner that severely disrupts another State’s economy. As perceptively noted by the ICRC, “[i]t would appear that the answer to these questions will probably be determined in a
definite manner only through future state practice.”28
In addition to being armed, cyber attacks must be of an “international”
nature to qualify as international armed conflict. The term international
denotes actions conducted by, or attributable to, a State. By the plain text
of the provisions cited above, those conducted by a State’s armed forces
qualify. Although not mentioned in those provisions, it is beyond dispute
that cyber attacks conducted by other organs of a State, such as intelligence
or law enforcement agencies, also qualify.29
As noted by the ICTY in Tadić, “private individuals acting within the
framework of, or in connection with, armed forces, or in collusion with

27. ICRC REPORT, supra note 25, at 37.
28. Id.
29. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep.
of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. DOC. A/56/10
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32,
U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles of State Responsibility]. Article 4(2) of the Articles of State Responsibility provides that an “organ includes
any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the
State.”
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State authorities may be regarded as de facto State organs.”30 Any cyber
attacks they launch would be treated as if launched by de jure State organs.
Cyber attacks carried out by a person or entity that, although not an organ
of the State, is “empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of
the governmental authority . . . provided the person or entity is acting in
that capacity in the particular instance” would likewise suffice.31 An example would be a private corporation that a State authorizes by law to conduct cyber operations on its behalf, so long as the operations in question
are of the sort for which said authorization was granted.
More problematic in terms of qualifying as international are activities
engaged in by individuals or groups that are neither organs of a State nor
authorized to act on its behalf. It appears clear that cyber attacks by individuals or groups acting sua sponte are generally not attributable to a State
for the purpose of finding an international armed conflict. The classic example is the “hacktivist” cyber campaign against Estonia in 2007 (moreover, they were not “armed”).32 However, if a State endorses and encourages
the perpetuation of the cyber operations, the individuals or groups involved will be deemed “de facto organs” of the State, such that the activity
meets the international criterion. This principle was enunciated (albeit, in
the State responsibility context) by the International Court of Justice in the
Hostages case and cited with approval by the ICTY in Tadić when dealing
with attribution for the purposes of conflict classification.33
Consider, for example, a case in which a group of one State’s nationals
conduct cyber attacks against another State. If the government of the first
State announces its approval of the attacks and takes steps to perpetuate
the attacks, as in the case of establishing cyber defense mechanisms that
preserve the group’s ability to continue its attacks, the group becomes a de
facto State organ even if that State did not originally provide direction to the
group.
A scenario in which some relationship exists between a State and the
individuals or group conducting the cyber attacks is more likely. The ICTY
30. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 144
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals
Chamber Judgment].
31. Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 5.
32. See generally the discussion of these incidents in TIKK, KASKA & VIHUL, supra
note 6.
33. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
3, ¶ 74 (May 24); Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 30, ¶¶ 133–37.
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addressed this situation head on in Tadić when assessing whether the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina was international by virtue of the relationship
between the Bosnian Serb armed groups and the Serb-dominated Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. In an often-overlooked distinction, the Tribunal
took different approaches to the actions of organized armed groups (defined below) and individuals.
As to the former, the ICTY held that the correct threshold was one of
“overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such
forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of
military operations.”34 The issuance of specific orders or instructions relating to a single operation is not required. To illustrate, a State that exercises
control over a group sufficient to allow it to direct the group to mount (or
to desist from mounting) a broad campaign of cyber attacks exercises overall control. Similarly, if a State instructs the group to attack, or refrain from
attacking, a particular category of cyber targets (as distinct from specific
targets), it enjoys overall control of the group. But note the Tribunal’s mention of equipping the group. Merely providing software or hardware with
which attacks are conducted does not suffice to attribute a group’s actions
to the State for the purpose of finding an international armed conflict (although such assistance may violate certain norms of international law).
The requisite degree of control over the actions of individuals who
conduct cyber attacks without being members of an organized armed
group is much higher. In such cases, the State must issue “specific instructions or directives aimed at the commission of specific acts” before attribution of the acts to the State for the purpose of classifying the conflict as
international occurs.35 Absent such instructions, the attacks cannot be attributed to the State for that purpose. Neither would the conflict be noninternational since, as will be discussed, the individuals do not comprise an
organized armed group.

34. Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 145. See also Lubanga, where
the International Criminal Court described overall control as “a role in organising, coordinating, or planning the military actions of the military group.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 211 (ICC Jan. 29,
2007) [hereinafter Lubanga]. In the Genocide case, the International Court of Justice observed that the overall control test “may well be . . . applicable and suitable.” Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 404 (Feb.
26).
35. Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 132.
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Should a State permit cyber attacks to take place from its territory, it
may be in breach of its international legal obligation to “police” its territory
in order to ensure it is not used for purposes harming other States. 36 Yet,
its tolerance of the attacks does not satisfy the international criterion unless, as mentioned, the State goes further. It is irrelevant whether the attacks in question are mounted by a single individual or, as in the Estonian
case, hundreds of persons.
Finally, it is sometimes questioned whether attribution to a State is required at all for qualification as an international armed conflict. In the Targeted Killing case, the Israeli Supreme Court argued that attribution is not
necessary so long as the group in question operates transnationally, that is,
the conflict “crosses the borders of the state.”37 In the cyber context, this
situation is highly probable, for organized armed groups might well launch
cyber attacks from relative safety abroad. The U.S. Supreme Court took a
contrary approach in Hamdan, where it found that the conflict with the AlQaeda terrorist organization was “not of an international character” because it was not between States.38 In light of the earlier discussion, the U.S.
position on this particular point is better reasoned.
IV. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CYBER CONFLICT
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions defines non-international
armed conflicts in the negative as those that are “not of an international
character.”39 The ICTY has further developed the notion of noninternational conflict. In Tadić, the Tribunal described such conflicts as
“protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and orga36. The International Court of Justice affirmed this principle in its first case, Corfu
Channel. The Court held that every State has an “obligation to not allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
37. Public Committee against Torture in Israel, supra note 3, ¶ 18.
38. Hamdan, supra note 3, 628–32 (2006).
39. GC I–IV, supra note 8, Common art. 3 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions.
. . .”). Only States can be High Contracting Parties. On non-international armed conflict
generally, see ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2010); EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES
IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS (2008); LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT (2002).
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nized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”40 The equivalent definition has been adopted by international tribunals and in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.41 Additional Protocol II also refers
to a conflict between a State’s armed forces “and dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups.” Accordingly, two essential criteria apply
for all non-international armed conflicts—participation by an organized
armed group and a particular level of intensity.
Organized armed groups must be both “organized” and “armed.”
Common Article 3 refers to “parties to a conflict,” a reference that serves
as the source of the organization requirement. In considering this requirement, the ICTY has noted
some degree of organisation by the parties will suffice to establish the existence of an armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as that required for establishing the responsibility of superiors for the acts of their
subordinates within the organization, as no determination of individual
criminal responsibility is intended under this provision of the Statute.42

But the group must nevertheless be organized. Organization allows for
acting in a coordinated manner, thereby generally heightening the capability
to engage in violence. In military operations, such coordination typically
involves mission planning, sharing intelligence, and exercising command
and control. In other words, the organization criterion implies that the actions are best understood as those of a group and not its individual members. This structural requirement is fundamental, for absent structure there
is no identifiable enemy to treat as the other party to the conflict.43
Whether a group is organized is always a fact and context specific determination. In Limaj, the ICTY looked to such factors as, inter alia, the existence of a formal command structure, the creation of unit zones of opera40. Tadić Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 2, ¶ 70.
41. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 619 (Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 92 (Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR73, Decision on Appeal Against “Decision on
Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence,” ¶ 32 (May 16,
2005) (Robertson, J., separate opinion); Lubanga, supra note 34, ¶ 233; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 229
(June 15, 2006); Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(f).
42. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Limaj].
43. For instance, in order to open termination of conflict negotiations.
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tion, the issuance of orders, the establishment of a headquarters and the
promulgation of disciplinary orders to find that the Kosovo Liberation
Army qualified as an organized armed group in its conflict with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.44
What is clear is that individuals acting alone that conduct cyber attacks
against a State (or a particular armed group) cannot meet the organized criterion. For example, despite the number of hacktivists involved in the
cyber operations against Estonia, they lacked the requisite degree of organization and therefore the operations did not amount to non-international
armed conflict. Similarly, consider a case in which a website containing
malware and listing potential cyber targets is accessed by large numbers of
individuals who are unaffiliated with the creator of the website. Those individuals who do so do not qualify as an organized armed group; they lack
the requisite structure. When cyber attacks are merely collective in the
sense of occurring in parallel, they are not organized.
Cyber attacks conducted by a group that organizes entirely on-line are
more difficult to classify. The members of virtual organizations may never
meet nor even know each other’s actual identity. Nevertheless, such groups
can act in a coordinated manner against the government (or an organized
armed group), take orders from a virtual leadership and be highly organized. For example, one element of the group might be tasked to identify
vulnerabilities in target systems, a second might develop malware to exploit
those vulnerabilities, a third might conduct the operations and a fourth
might maintain cyber defenses against counter-attacks.
The primary obstacle to characterization of the group as organized
would be its inability to enforce compliance with international humanitarian law. Additional Protocol II imposes a requirement that a group be “under responsible command” before a non-international armed conflict covered by the instrument exists.45 This requirement should not be interpreted
too strictly. As noted in the ICRC Commentary to the article, the term
implies some degree of organization of the insurgent armed group or dissident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean that there is a hierarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular armed
forces. It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of planning

44. Limaj, supra note 42, ¶¶ 94–129.
45. AP II, supra note 18, art. 1(1).
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and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations, and on the
other, of imposing discipline in the name of a de facto authority.46

In a virtually organized group, the requirement of an ability to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations could be met to the extent that
cyber operations are equated with military operations, which, as discussed,
is the case. However, imposing discipline would be difficult since the group
lacks physical control over its members.
Complicating matters is Additional Protocol II’s requirement that the
group be able “to implement this Protocol.” 47 The phrase is generally understood as an ability to comply with and enforce international humanitarian law. Before violence can qualify as a Protocol II conflict, “the parties
may reasonably be expected to apply the rules developed in the Protocol,
since they have the minimum infrastructure required therefor.”48 While
there is no requirement that the law actually be enforced, the group must
be organized so as to enable enforcement. In a virtually organized group,
such organization is lacking since there is no physical connection between
the members.
It must be cautioned that since this treaty law requirement derives from
Additional Protocol II, it is only applicable in and of itself to conflicts in
which that instrument applies. Common Article 3 contains no equivalent
condition, thereby raising the question of whether an analogous customary
law norm applies to conflicts other than Additional Protocol II noninternational armed conflicts. In this regard, the commentary to Article 3
notes that the Diplomatic Conference that drafted the 1949 Geneva Conventions considered setting express preconditions for such conflicts. Although the proposal was rejected, the Commentary asserts that they “constitute convenient criteria.”49 The first condition was that the “Party in revolt
against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an
authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and
having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.”50
It would appear reasonable, therefore, to extend the Additional Protocol II
requirements regarding responsible command (vis-à-vis enforcing disci46. AP COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶ 4663.
47. AP II, supra note 18, art. 1(1).
48. AP COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶ 4470.
49. COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 49 (Jean
Pictet ed., 1952).
50. Id.
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pline) and an ability to implement international humanitarian law to all
non-international armed conflicts. The ICTY adopted this approach in
Boskoski51 and it is consistent with the principle of command responsibility
in non-international armed conflicts.52 If valid, the extension to all noninternational armed conflicts would preclude virtually organized groups
from qualifying as organized armed groups for the purpose of classifying a
conflict as non-international.
In addition to being organized, the group in question must be armed.
The meaning of armed in the non-international armed conflict context parallels that attending international armed conflict. As discussed, it generally
presumes the conduct of “attacks.” Yet, since non-international armed
conflict is premised on the activities of a group, as distinct from a State, the
question of attribution of an individual member’s conduct to the group as a
whole arises. Since it is the group that must be armed, the group itself must
have a purpose of carrying out armed activities. If individual members of
an organized group carry out cyber attacks on their own accord, that is, not
on behalf of the group, the group does not meet the armed criterion.
In contradistinction to international armed conflict, non-international
armed conflict entails a certain degree of intensity. Recall that riots, civil
disturbances, or isolated and sporadic acts of violence do not suffice; the
hostilities must also be protracted. Decisions of the ICTY have cited such
factors as the gravity of the attacks, the collective character of the hostilities, the need to increase forces to deal with the situation, the time over
which the hostilities have taken place, and whether the United Nations Security Council has addressed the matter as bearing on whether the intensity
threshold is satisfied.53 However, no bright-line intensity test exists, nor is
there any clear standard for “protracted” conflict.54 In light of the manner
51. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 205 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
52. Although responsible command and command responsibility are separate legal
concepts, it would be illogical to impose command responsibility on an individual for the
actions of individuals who are members of a group that are not under responsible command; the concepts are therefore different, but related. On the issue, see Prosecutor v.
Hadzihazanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, ¶¶ 16–22 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003).
53. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (summarizing various indicative factors).
54. In Abella, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights characterized a thirty-hour clash between dissident armed forces and the Argentinian military as non248
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in which cyber campaigns are mounted, it must be noted that although
cyber attacks have to be frequent enough to be considered related, they
clearly do not have to be continuous.
This is a high threshold that would preclude many cyber operations
from sufficing for the purpose of finding a non-international armed conflict. Even highly destructive cyber attacks would fail to qualify unless they
occurred on a regular basis over time. They would instead be addressed
within the criminal law paradigm and be governed internationally by human rights, not humanitarian, law.
One issue that is somewhat murky is the classification status of cyber
attacks conducted by an organized armed group during an international
armed conflict between two States. It is clear that if a group “belongs to” a
party to the conflict, the conflict remains wholly international in character.
The concept of belonging to, which stems from Article 4 of Geneva Convention III, implies at least some de facto relationship between the group
and a State that is a party.55 The article’s commentary suggests that even
tacit agreement is sufficient so long as it is clear for which side the group is
fighting.56
Much more complicated is the situation in which a group engages in
cyber attacks without doing so on behalf of one of the parties to an international armed conflict. This is not a remote hypothetical. For instance,
when the conflict in Iraq was still international in character, organized
armed groups lacking any connection with the Baathist regime attacked
coalition forces. The groups, such as the Shia militia, were opposed to both
sides during that conflict. An analogous situation could easily arise in which
a group mounts cyber attacks against a party sua sponte.
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities addresses such situations. It contends that “organized armed groups
operating within the broader context of an international armed conflict
without belonging to a party to that conflict could still be regarded as parties to a separate non-international armed conflict.”57 Some participants in
the expert process that resulted in the Guidance rejected the ICRC’s position
international armed conflict. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, OEA\Ser.L\V\II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 148, 327 (1998).
55. GC III, supra note 8, art. 4A(2).
56. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 57.
57. NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 24 (2009).
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on the basis that it would prove problematic in practice because it requires
application of the law of both international and of non-international armed
conflict in the same battlespace.58 In their view, it was more appropriate to
ask whether an unambiguous nexus existed between the actions of the
group in question and the international armed conflict, rather than any party thereto. For instance, an organized armed group might conduct cyber
attacks against an occupying force because of religious or political opposition to the occupants, not to expel them on behalf of the government. The
requisite nexus between the group and the conflict would be their opposition to the occupation. In such a case, the conflict would remain entirely
international irrespective of the lack of a relationship between the group
and the occupied State.
Finally, recall that Additional Protocol II only applies when organized
armed groups control territory. Since a group cannot control territory
without physical presence, the instrument is generally thought to be inapplicable to cyber-only conflicts. It would accordingly only apply to cyber
operations in those Additional Protocol II conflicts involving an organized
armed group that controls territory and conducts such operations.
V. CONCLUSION
To date, States have refrained from characterizing any cyber operations
conducted outside the context of an on-going armed conflict as either international or non-international armed conflict. Be that as it may, cyber operations will in the future inevitably present difficult conflict classification
challenges for States. With regard to international armed conflict, attribution of cyber operations conducted by non-State actors will likely prove
even more problematic than the attribution to States of kinetic actions has
been in the past. In the context of non-international armed conflict, qualification as an organized armed group will prove increasingly complex as
the structures, means and prevalence of virtual organization grow and
evolve. Perhaps most importantly, the approach taken in this article to the
interpretation of the term “armed” is, although presently reflecting lex lata,
unlikely to survive. With States and non-State actors engaging in ever more
destructive and disruptive cyber operations and societies becoming deeply
dependent on the cyber infrastructure, State practice accompanied by opinio
juris can be expected to result in a lowering of the current threshold. The
58. Based on author’s participation.
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law of cyber armed conflict is a work in progress and will remain so for the
immediate future.
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